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ABSTRACT
Malware Classification Using LSTMs
by Dennis Dang
Signature and anomaly based detection have long been quintessential techniques
used in malware detection. However, these techniques have become increasingly
ineffective as malware becomes more complex. Researchers have therefore turned
to deep learning to construct better performing models. In this project, we create
four different long-short term memory (LSTM) models and train each model to
classify malware by family type. Our data consists of opcodes extracted from malware
executables. We employ techniques used in natural language processing (NLP) such
as word embedding and bidirection LSTMs (biLSTM). We also use convolutional
neural networks (CNN). We found that our model consisting of word embedding,
biLSTMs and CNN layers performed the best in classifying malware.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malicious software (malware) are computer programs that are created to harm a
computer, computer systems or a computer user [6]. Malware attacks can disrupt a
person’s or organization’s day-to-day use of their computer systems, steal personal or
confidential information, corrupt files or annoy users. Malware can be categorized
into different families where the behavior of one malware from one particular family
differs from that of another family. The authors in [7] and [8] for example, discuss the
behavior of many different types of malware families.
Malware attacks are generally facilitated by the Internet. With the rise in the
number of devices around us that are connected to the Internet, it has become more
important than ever to keep our devices safe lest we risk loss of personal or confidential
information [7]. Malware attacks can even be life threatening. In 2017, a ransomware1
attack crippled many parts the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS) [9].
Computer systems containing data pertaining to the health and history of thousands
of patients were targeted across dozens of hospitals in the UK. Hospitals were forced
to pay a ransom to have their files unlocked or risk having them files corrupted and
deleted forever. These attacks not only caused doctors and nurses to cancel some
19,000 appointments but also cost the NHS £92 million. Malware is clearly a challenge
that warrants a signficant research effort.
Malware detection techniques include signature based detection, anomaly based
detection and machine learning based detection [6]. Signature based detection has long
been the most popular approach to detecting malware. In signature based detection,
each malware sample is first analyzed and a signature is extracted, which is then used
1

Ransomware is a type of malware that threatens to corrupt, delete, publish or block the victim’s
data unless a ransom is paid.
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to identify the malware. If the signature is found in another sample, that sample is
flagged as possible malware. However, various code obfuscation and code morphing
techniques can easily thwart signature based detection mechanisms. In anomaly based
detection, the system looks for activity that falls outside the “normal” range of the
computer and flags such behavior as suspicious [10]. A major downside to anomaly
based detection is the high rate of false positives. The drawbacks of signature and
anomaly based detection techniques have motivated the rise of machine learning based
detection.
Many classical machine learning algorithms have found success in detecting
malware [11]. These algorithms include support vector machines (SVM), hidden
markov models (HMM), random forest and naive Bayes, among many others. These
models rely heavily on proper feature extraction from the dataset. Deep learning
techniques have gained a lot of traction. Particularly, multilayer perceptrons (MLPs),
convolutional neural networks (CNNs), extreme learning machines (ELM) have been
used with great success [12]. Other techniques involving variants of recurrent neural
networks (RNN) such as gated recurrent units (GRUs) and long-short term memories
(LSTMs) have received far less attention in the literature [13].
In this research, we focus on using LSTMs to classify malware by family. We
build on the work in [13] by combining various aspects of the methodologies employed
in [14], [15] and [16]. Our dataset includes opcodes from malware belonging to 20
distinct families, and we use opcode sequences as our features. We consider five
models, with each model being successively more complex. Our first model is the most
basic consisting of only MLPs. This model serves as a baseline from which we compare
our other LSTM models to. Our second model consists of only one LSTM layer. Our
third model is an enhanced LSTM that includes an embedding layer, similar to the
model considered in [13]. Our fourth model replaces the LSTM layer from our second
2

previous model with a biLSTM layer. Finally, our fifth model includes everything from
our third model, plus an additional one-dimension CNN layer and a one-dimension
max pooling layer. As far as we are a aware, our fourth and fifth models have not
previously been considered in the literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant
previous work and introduces the various deep learning techniques employed in this
research. Section 3 covers the dataset, feature extraction, parameters, and so on. In
Section 4, we present our experimental results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper,
and we mention possible directions for future work.

3

CHAPTER 2
Background
2.1

Previous Work
The authors of [14] consider various models for malware classification. In one

of these models, a two stage classifier is used— the first stage is either an LSTM or
GRU which is used to derive features for a second stage classifier consisting of a single
MLP layer. Another model uses a single stage classifier consisting of nine CNN layers.
When trained and evaluated, both models achieved an about 80% accuracy.
In [15], the author proposes a novel deep learning architecture that includes both
a CNN layer and an LSTM layer. This model is then trained on API call sequences.
The CNN portion of the model consists of filters of increasing size, with the output of
each filter fed into the LSTM layer. The output of the LSTM layer is used as input
to a dropout layer, with a final fully connected layer for classification. The output of
the dense layer is the model’s prediction for the given input. This model achieved an
accuracy approaching 100%.
The authors of [16] consider a biLSTM based model to classify malware in a cloud
based system. The model includes a CNN layer and is trained on system call sequences.
The authors achieve an overall accuracy of approximately 90%. Interestingly, the
authors also show that substituting the biLSTM for a regular LSTM layer resulted in
worse accuracies in almost all cases.
The author in [13] classifies malware using an entirely different approach from
the two papers mentioned above. The work in [13] is based on opcodes obtained from
disassembled executables. This research also employs word embedding as a feature
engineering step. Word embedding techniques are often used in natural language
processing (NLP) applications. The result from word embedding are fed into an LSTM
layer. For malware detection, this model attains an average AUC of 0.99, while for
4

classification, the model achieves an average AUC of 0.987.
Besides using LSTMs and its architectural variants, other machine learning
algorithms have been used to classify malware. For instance, in [17], the authors
classify malware using random forests. Their technique is a three stage process. First,
malware binaries are visualized as images. This allows models to better identify
patterns within the binaries which, in turn, allows models to overcome obfuscation
tactics. While obfuscation introduces changes to the binary images, the general
structure of the image is the same allowing models to identify the malware type.
After converting the binaries to images, the next step in the authors’ technique is
feature extraction from the images. Finally, random forest classifiers are applied
on the resulting features. Using this technique, the authors’ were able to achieve a
classification accuracy of over 98%.
In [18], the authors employ six different machine learning algorithms. The
algorithms used are random forest, k-nearest neighbors (kNN), support vector machines
(SVM), naive Bayes, MLPs and decision trees. The dataset that was used consisted
of the malware signatures from approximately 5,800 malware samples from the Zeus,
APT1, Crypto, Locker and shadowbrokers families. Using two different machine
learning libraries, the authors were able to achieve an accuracy of 89.8%, 87.6%,
87.8%, 94.2%, 92.5% and 54.3% for the kNN, naive Bayes, MLP, random forest,
decision tree and SVM algorithms, respectively.
2.2

Recurrent Neural Networks
In feed-forward neural networks1 , all training samples are treated independently

of each other [19]. Consequently, feed-forward networks are impractical for cases where
training samples depend on previous samples. Thus, a different type of architecture is
needed in cases where “memory” is required, as when training on time series data.
1

Also called multilayer perceptrons (MLP).
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Figure 1: Illustration comparing the differences between an RNN and a feed-forward network [1].

Recurrent neural networks (RNN) serve to add memory to the network [20]. As
shown in Figure 1, the output in a RNN depends not only on the current input but also
the input from the past, as indicated by a feedback loop. Whereas information only
flows forward in a feed-forward network, information from the previous timesteps are
available at each subsequent timestep in RNNs [21]. An unfolded structure of a RNN
shown in Figure 2 shows a more complete picture of how data flows in RNNs [22].

Figure 2: The structure of an unrolled RNN layer [2].

In Figure 2, 𝑥𝑡 is the input at timestep 𝑡 and is associated with 𝑈 which is a
6

weight matrix. The output at timestep 𝑡 is represented by 𝑜𝑡 has a corresponding
weight matrix 𝑉 . The memory of the network (also called the ‘‘hidden state’’) at
timestep 𝑡 is represented by 𝑠𝑡 and is calculated from the previous timestep. The
weight matrix for 𝑠𝑡 is symbolized by 𝑊 . To calculate 𝑠𝑡 , we use the current input
and previous hidden state in the function 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑓 (𝑈 𝑥𝑡 + 𝑊 𝑠𝑡−1 ) where 𝑓 is some kind
of nonlinear activation function such as tanh or ReLU.
2.3

The Vanishing and Exploding Gradient
RNNs perform well with short term dependencies but struggle with longer term

dependency. The wider the gap between the contextual information and the place
that it is needed, the worse the model performs. This long-term dependency problem
occurs due to the ‘‘vanishing gradient’’ problem [23]. During training, RNNs calculate
gradients to update the weights of the model. Due to the architecture of the model,
calculating these gradients involve multiplying together many values less than one [23].
The longer sequence of data, the more terms get added to these products. As a result,
these values become so small that the gradients quickly approach zero. Since the
change in the model’s weights depend on the magnitude of the gradients, a small
gradient leads to either slow learning or no learning whatsoever. These small gradient
values are therefore said to be ‘‘vanishing’’.
The vanishing gradient occurs when either the sigmoid or hyperbolic tangent
activation functions is used. The opposite behavior called the ‘‘exploding gradient’’
occurs while using the ReLU activation function [24]. Rather than multiplying together
small numbers, the exploding gradient occurs when the model multiplies together
large values. With enough terms, this product can grow exponentially fast thereby
making it impossible for the RNN model to learn the temporal relationship between
distant events.

7

2.4

Long Short-Term Memory
To overcome the vanishing and exploding gradient issues, comlex gated RNN

architectures have been developed. The best known and most widely used of these
is long short-term memory (LSTM) models. LSTMs address the issue of long-term
dependency by, in effect, decoupling the memory from the output of the network and
ensuring that additive updates are done to the memory, rather than multiplicative
updates. With additive updates, the gradient is more stable.

Figure 3: Unrolled structure of a vanilla RNN cell and an LSTM cell [3].

Other than ensuring a more stable gradient, there are more architectural differences between RNNs and LSTMs. Figure 3 illustrates the differences between the
internal structures of a RNN cell and a LSTM cell. LSTMs maintain two hidden
8

states that are carried along from one timestep to the next. The hidden state ℎ𝑡−1
consists of a modified form of the output from the previous timestep 𝑡 − 1 to the
next timestep 𝑡. The cell state is represented by 𝑐𝑡−1 . It is the model’s memory and
carries information over a long period of time of the inputs from earlier timesteps. If
the model encounters information that is deemed important, it is added to the cell
state. Otherwise, information that is not deemed important will be deleted. This is
necessary as carrying too much information from the start to the end of the input
data sequence can cause poor performance.
Other than these states, LSTM models consist of three gates. These are the
forget gate 𝑓𝑡 , the input gate 𝑖𝑡 and the output gate 𝑜𝑡 [3]. The input gate determines
what kind of new information is to be added to the overall memory, the forget gate
determines what kind of information to forget and the output gate determines what
kind of values the cell will pass to the next timestep. These gates are further explained
as follows.
1. Forget Gate: The forget gate 𝑓𝑡 determines what information to remove from
the model’s memory. Removing certain information is vital to the model since
the model will perform poorly if it tries to remember everything. The value of
this gate is determined by calculating
𝑓𝑡 = 𝜎(𝑊𝑓 𝑥𝑡 + 𝑈𝑓 ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑓 )

(1)

Where 𝑊𝑓 and 𝑈𝑓 are the weights on 𝑥𝑡 and ℎ𝑡−1 for the forget gate respectively
and 𝑏𝑓 is a constant and called a bias parameter. Since 𝑓𝑡 is a sigmoid function,
the output will be a value between 0 and 1. A value of 0 indicates completely
getting forgetting a learned value while a value of 1 indicates completely keeping
the value. Figure 4 shows where the forget gate resides in the model.
9

Figure 4: The forget gate in a LSTM cell [3].

2. Input Gate: The input gate 𝑖𝑡 determines if new data should be added to
the model’s memory and consists of a sigmoid function and a tanh function.
The tanh portion creates candidate values to add to memory while the sigmoid
portion determines which of these candidate values should be added and to what
extend each value should be committed to memory. Symbolically, these two
portions are expressed as
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜎(𝑊𝑖 𝑥𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖 ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑖 )
𝐶˜𝑡 = tanh(𝑊𝐶˜ 𝑥𝑡 + 𝑈𝐶˜ ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝐶˜ )

(2)
(3)

Similarly as before, 𝑊𝑖 and 𝑈𝑖 are weights on 𝑥𝑡 and ℎ𝑡−1 for the input gate
respectively and 𝑏𝑖 is a bias constant. The candidate values is represented as 𝐶˜𝑡 .
Figure 5 shows where the input gate resides in the model
3. Output Gate: The output gate 𝑜𝑡 determines the value of the output of the
model at the current timestep. Just like the input gate, this gate also consists
of a sigmoid portion and a tanh portion. The sigmoid portion determines what
parts of the memory will be in the output. In the tanh portion, tanh is applied
to the cell state to push the values between −1 and 1. Finally, the final output
is a product of the sigmoid and tanh portions which represents a filtered version
10

Figure 5: The input gate gate in a LSTM cell [3].

of the cell state. These two portions are symbolically expressed as
𝑜𝑡 = 𝜎(𝑊𝑜 𝑥𝑡 + 𝑈𝑜 ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑜 )

(4)

ℎ𝑡 = 𝑜𝑡 tanh(𝐶𝑡 )

(5)

Where 𝑊𝑜 and 𝑈𝑜 are weights on 𝑥𝑡 and ℎ𝑡−1 and 𝑏𝑜 is the bias constant. The
output of the model ℎ𝑡 for timestep 𝑡 is the hidden state for the next timestep
𝑡 + 1. Figure 6 shows where the output gate resides in the model.

Figure 6: The output gate in a LSTM cell [3].

In between calculating the values for the input and output gates, the model
updates its memory. Figure 7 shows where updating the cell state occurs in the model.
This process is done in two steps. First, portions of the memory that are no longer
important are forgotten. This is done by multiplying the cell state from the previous
11

timestep 𝐶𝑡−1 with the forget gate 𝑓𝑡 . Afterwards, the new values are added to the
memory using the input gate 𝑖𝑡 and the candidate values 𝐶˜𝑡 . Symbolically, the new
cell state for the current timestep 𝐶𝑡 is expressed as
𝐶𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡 𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑡 𝐶˜𝑡

(6)

Figure 7: Updating the cell state [3].

2.5

LSTM Training
Training a LSTM model consists of a performing a forward pass followed by a

backwards pass. In the forward pass, the model calculates the values of the forget,
input, candidate and output gates as described in equations 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively [3].
These values along with the input at the current timestep are then used to calculate
the hidden state, cell state and output for the current timestep [25]. These calculations
are repeated for every timestep. The forward pass is complete once the error of the
output is calculated using the known output and a specified loss function.
Once the forward pass is done, we do a backwards pass where the weights and
biases of the model are updated based on the error calculated in the previous steps.
The backwards pass is thus where the model does the learning.
For a given input, there is a final output value of the model 𝑦ˆ𝑡 along with what
the value that the model should have produced 𝑦𝑡 for the given input. Using these
12

values, we can specify an error function as a function of both values as
𝐸(ˆ
𝑦𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡 )
The exact function for 𝐸(ˆ
𝑦𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡 ) varies greatly based on the application of the
model. A plethora of loss functions are discussed in detail in [26]. Once an error
function is known, the LSTM model updates its weights and biases by calculating
the gradient of the error function with respect to all weights and biases used in the
model [27]. For timestep 𝑡, we will have an error 𝐸𝑡 . The gradient of 𝐸𝑡 is
(︂
)︂
𝜕𝐸𝑡 𝜕𝐸𝑡 𝜕𝐸𝑡
,
,
∇𝐸𝑡 =
𝜕𝑊 𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝑏
𝑊 = (𝑊𝑖 , 𝑊𝑓 , 𝑊𝑐˜, 𝑊𝑜 )
𝑈 = (𝑈𝑖 , 𝑈𝑓 , 𝑈𝑐˜, 𝑈𝑜 )
𝑏 = (𝑏𝑖 , 𝑏𝑓 , 𝑏𝑐˜, 𝑏𝑜 )
These calculations must be done at every timestep [27]. Thus for 𝑇 timesteps,
we have
𝑇

∑︁ 𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝜕𝐸
=
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑊
𝑡=1
𝑇

𝜕𝐸 ∑︁ 𝜕𝐸𝑡
=
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑈
𝑡=1
𝑇

𝜕𝐸 ∑︁ 𝜕𝐸𝑡
=
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑏
𝑡=1
Once the gradients are calculated, the weights and biases of the model are updated
using
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝐸
𝑈 =𝑈 −𝛼
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐸
𝑏=𝑏−𝛼
𝜕𝑏

𝑊 =𝑊 −𝛼
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Where 𝛼 is the learning rate of the model. Once this calculation is done, the
backward pass is complete. These steps are repeated for all input data into the model.
2.6

Bidirectional LSTM
BiLSTM models are an expansion of LSTMs that process a sequence of data

in both forward and backward directions in two separate LSTM layers [28]. The
forward layer processes the data in the same way as a standard LSTM, while the
backward layer processes the same data but in reverse order [29]. Figure 8 shows
an unfolded architecture of a biLSTM with three consecutive timesteps. At every
timestep, there are two hidden states values. The hidden state values in the forward
→
−
layer ℎ are calculated from timestep 𝑡0 to 𝑡𝑛−1 in the forward direction where 𝑛 is the
total number of timesteps for a given sequence of data. Correspondingly, the hidden
←
−
state values in the backward layer ℎ are calculated in reverse order from 𝑡𝑛−1 to 𝑡0 .
A final output 𝑦𝑡 is calculated at each timestep that combines together both of these
hidden states. This is represented as
→
− ←
−
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓 ( ℎ𝑡 , ℎ𝑡 )
Where 𝑓 is a function that can be a summation, multiplication, concatenation or
an average function [26]. The type of function used will depend on the nature of the
problem and will generally vary from one application the next.
The consequence of combining the forward and backward layers is that the
outputs at every timestep will include information not only from future timesteps
but also from timesteps in the past. This kind of model is useful in applications such
as machine translation. In machine translation, it is often necessary to know the
words that occur later on in the sentence in order to produce an accurate translation.
Normal LSTM models would not work in this application because these models can
only make use of information from previous timesteps. BiLSTMs would be the model
14

Figure 8: The architecture of an unfolded bidirectional LSTM with three consecutive timesteps [4].

to use if the output at any timestep depends on future and past timesteps.
2.7

Word Embedding
One of the challenges in NLP is converting words into numbers for machine

learning models. One-hot encoding is a technique that solves this problem. In one-hot
encoding, words are represented by one-dimensional vectors of zeroes at all indices
except at a certain index in which the value at that index is one [30]. The location of
this designated index varies from one word to the next. Additionally, the length of
the vector grows by one for every new word encountered in the dataset. Examples of
one-hot encoding vectors for various European places are shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9: One-hot encoding vector representations of text.

15

While one-hot encoding allows text to be represented numerically in a systematic
way, there are many disadvantages. One major disadvantage is that one-hot encoding
does not efficiently use memory. This is because only the index of one value within
the vector distinguishes one word from the next. The size of these vectors can grow
tremendously for datasets where there are many unique words and if there are too
many words, there may be inadequate memory to store these one-hot encoded vectors
that consist mainly of zeroes. Another drawback is in the inability to represent
words of similar meaning in a similar way. It has been found that similar words
having similar representations greatly increases the model’s ability to learn words and
language [31].
An alternative to one-hot encoding is word embedding. In word embedding,
words are represented as vectors of floats [31]. Unlike one-hot encoding, the size of
this vector does not grow for each additional new word encountered in the dataset.
Once an initial size is set, these vectors remain fixed at that size. Additionally, word
embedding allows similar representation of similar words. If two words are similar
in meaning, the values in the corresponding vectors of each word are close in value
which allows models to learn words easier and faster. Examples of vectors for various
words are shown in Figure 10.
Word embedding layers are neural networks that are trained with the rest of the
model. With an adequately large dataset, word embedding layers can learn which
words are similar in meaning through context and can therefore learn the vector
representations of these words that ther rest of the machine learning model can use.
2.8

Convolutional Neural Networks and Max Pooling
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are designed to efficiently deal with local

structure [32]. CNNs are often used with images, but the technique can excel in any
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Figure 10: Examples of word embedding vectors for various vectors and their 2D plots [5].

application where local structure dominates.
The hidden layers within a CNN act as filters where each filter specializes in
detecting a certain feature within the data, while deeper layers detect progressively
more abstract features. For example, when training on images, first layer filters
might detect vertical and horizontal lines, the final layer might be able to distinguish
between images of, say, dogs and cats.
Within every CNN layer of a model, the number of filters and size of each filter
must be specified. These filters are matrices with relatively small dimensions. In
two-dimensions, we can specify a filter 𝐹 = {𝑓𝑖𝑗 } with dimensions 𝑛 × 𝑚. We can
also specify a two-dimensional matrix 𝐴 = {𝑎𝑖𝑗 } of dimensions 𝑁 × 𝑀 representing
an image. To apply the filter 𝐹 to the image 𝐴, we perform a convolving operation
𝑐𝑖𝑗 =

𝑛−1 𝑚−1
∑︁
∑︁

𝑓𝑘𝑙 · 𝑎𝑖+𝑘,𝑗+𝑙

𝑘=0 𝑙=0

Where 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 𝑛 and 𝑗 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑀 − 𝑚. The elements of the smaller
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matrix 𝐶 is represented by 𝑐𝑖𝑗 with dimensions (𝑁 − 𝑛) × (𝑀 − 𝑚) that is the result
of applying the filter 𝐹 to image 𝐴. If the CNN model contains more layers, than
this output matrix 𝐶 becomes the input for the next layer. This operation is repeated
for all CNN layers.
While not strictly required, pooling layers can be applied in between CNN layers.
These layers reduce the dimensionality, thereby reducing the computational load.
Pooling can also reduce noise and potentially improve performance. In max pooling,
we specify a window size and only the maximum value within each (non-overlapping)
window is retained.
2.9

TensorFlow Layers
TensorFlow models are created by adding various layers in sequence. What

distinguishes one model from another is the type of layers used and the parameter
passed into the constructors of each layer. A short description of each layer is provided
below [33].
• Input Layer: The first layer and entry point into a neural network
• Dropout Layer: Adds noise to the network during training by randomly
severing the number of connections between neurons from one layer to the next.
In doing so, overfitting is reduced allowing models to better generalize. This
has the effect of increasing model accuracy during evaluation.
• LSTM Layer: Implements a single LSTM layer with all of the algorithms
required for forward and backward propagation.
• Bidirectional Layer: A wrapper layer that allows RNN layers to implement
bidirectional models. Rather than implementing two separate RNN layers for the
forwards and backwards direction and concatenating the results, the bidirectional
wrapper layer does all of this in one layer.
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• Dense Layer: Implements a single fully connected vanilla neural network layer.
• Embedding Layer: Responsible for mapping positive integers to vectors of
floating point values.
• Conv1D Layer: Implements the convolutional neural network layer in one
dimension.
• MaxPooling1D Layer: Implements the max pooling operation in one dimension.
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CHAPTER 3
Dataset Preparation and Experimental Design
The dataset used in this project was acquired from [8] and from [34]. Our dataset
consists of binary files from 20 distinct malware families. The names of the malware
families and the number of samples per family is shown in Table 1.
To extract features from our dataset, we first disassemble every executable file and
extracted mnemonic opcode sequences. Afterwards, we perform a frequency analysis
on all opcodes. The results from this frequency analysis is used to sort opcodes in
order of decreasing frequency. Next, we create an opcode to integer mapping where
each opcode is assigned a unique integer. Finally, we use this mapping to convert
each opcode mnemonic into integers.
We retain the 30 most frequent opcodes, with all other opcodes grouped into a
single “other” category. The top 30 opcodes represent about 80% all opcodes in our
dataset.
File disassembling consists of obtaining the opcode instructions for the binary
file. This was done by importing the files into a Ubuntu virtual machine and using
the objdump Linux command. To display the opcodes, the flag -d was used. This
flag indicates that only the machine instructions portion of the binary file is to be
disassembled; other sections such as headers are ignored. The result of running this
command is piped through various sed and cut commands in order to isolate the
opcodes. After running these commands for a single executable file, we obtain the
executable file’s opcodes. An example of a file’s opcodes written to a text file is shown
in Figure 11.
After disassembling, the next step is to create a lookup table that maps a specific
opcode to an integer. This is necessary because the model cannot directly work with
an opcode string; models can only work with numbers. To do this, a frequency analysis
20

Malware Family

Number of Samples

Adload
Agent
Alureon
Bho
CeeInject
Cycbot
DelfInject
Fakerean
Hotbar
Lolyda
Obfuscator
Onlinegames
Rbot
Renos
Starpage
Vobfus
Vundo
Winwebsec
Zbot
Zeroacess

1,044
817
1,327
1,159
886
1,029
1,097
1,063
1,476
915
1,331
1,284
817
1,309
1,084
924
1,784
3,651
1,785
1,119

Table 1: Number of samples of malware files per family.

Figure 11: Sample opcode file.

is first done where the most frequent opcodes that are present throughout the dataset
appear at the beginning of a list. Afterwards, the first 30 opcodes are assigned a
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unique incrementing integer starting at 1. All other opcodes past the first 30 opcodes
are assigned the number 31. A dictionary is then created using this data where the
keys are the opcode string and the values are the associated integer assigned to each
opcode. Using this dictionary as a lookup table, the opcodes from the text files are
converted into numeric values that can be used in a model.
The models used in this project require all input data to be of the same length. To
accomplish this, we experimented with various opcode sequence lengths, as discussed
below. Of course, truncating the opcode sequence results in a loss of information, but
using a short sequence improves efficiency, and we have obtained strong results with
relatively short feature vectors.
3.1

Hardware and Software Setup
The models used in this project were run on a PC desktop. The specifications of

this machine is shown in Table 2. Software, operating system and Python packages
used are shown in Table 3.
Hardware

Feature

Details

CPU

Brand and Model
Base Clock Speed
# Core
# Threads

Intel i7-8700
3.2 GHz
6
12

GPU

Chipset
Video Memory
Memory Speed
Cuda Cores

NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1070 Ti
8GB GDDR5
1683 MHz
2432

DRAM

Brand and Model
Amount
Speed

G. Skill TridentZ RGB Series
2 ×8GB = 16GB
3200MHz

Motherboard

Brand and Model

MSI Z370 SLI Plus LGA 1151

Table 2: Relevant desktop PC hardware specifications.
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Software

Version Details

OS
Python
Jupyter Notebook
Numpy
Scikit Learn
Tensorflow-GPU
CUDA Toolkit
cuDNN SDK
NVidia GPU Drivers
Oracle VM VirtualBox
VM OS

Windows 10 Pro
3.8.3
6.1.4
1.18.5
0.23.2
2.3.1
10.1
7.6
431.36
6.0.10
Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS

Table 3: Relevant software, operating system and Python packages.

3.2

Model Parameters
Deep learning models generally have many parameters. For each of our models,

we performed a grid search over all combinations of the values listed in Table 4. All
models were trained and evaluated on the same dataset. For every model evaluated,
the accuracy was determined and the parameters for the model with highest accuracy
were generally selected. In a few cases where accuracy differences were deemed
insignificant, we selected parameters so that training times were reduced. Table 5
shows the values of the parameters selected.
Parameter
Opcode Lengths

Values Used
[2000, 4000, 6000, 8000, 10000]

LSTM Units

[16, 32, 64, 128, 256]

Embedding Vector Lengths

[16, 32, 64, 128, 256]

Dropout Amount

[0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4]

Table 4: The parameters and values for these parameters used in a grid search to determine the
best possible combination of values to use in the models for this project.

3.3

Training and Testing Methodologies
The dataset was sorted in ascending order based on the number of training

samples per family. The dataset was then partitioned into four groups of five families
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Parameter
Batch Size

Value
32

Maximum Number of Epochs

100

Percentage of Data to be Used in Testing

15%

Number of Unique Opcodes Used

30

Opcode Sequence Length

2,000

Dropout Amount

30%

Number of LSTM Units

16

Number of Dense Units

50

Embedding Vector Length

128

CNN Kernal Size

3

Number of CNN Filters

128

Max Pooling Size

2

Table 5: The values of the parameters used in the models.

each, where the first group consisted of families with the most malware samples, while
the last group consisted of families with the least samples. The dataset was partitioned
in this manner in order to allow the models to have the highest accuracy possible
when classifying each group of families. The more samples there are for a family, the
easier it should be for the models to learn that particular and tell it apart from other
families. And so by grouping the families in this order, we should be able to see the
highest accuracy possible for each model.
The models were trained on the first group of 5 families, then the second group
of 10 (i.e., the first and second groups of 5), then the third group of 15, and finally on
all families together. With each additional group, the difficulty of classifying malware
by family increased. Table 6 shows the families that constitute each group. Table 7
shows the number of training and testing samples for each additional group.
The initial values of the weights of the LSTM are randomly selected and the
embedding and dense layers are randomly initialized each time the models are trained,
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and hence the model accuracy will likely vary each time a model is trained. Therefore,
we train each model type on each grouping of malware families five times. At the
start of every training run, the dataset is shuffled before being split into training and
testing sets. The average of these five values are used to compare the model types.
Group
Number

1

Total Number
of Files

Malware
Families

10,005

Winwebsec
Zbot
Vundo
Hotbar
Renos

6,220

Obfuscator
Alureon
Onlinegames
Bho
Zeroaccess

5,317

Delfinject
Startpage
Fakerean
Adload
Cycbot

4,359

Vobfus
Lolyda
Ceeinject
Agent
Rbot

2

3

4

Table 6: Groupings of each family for training.

Groups

Families

1
1,2
1,2,3
1,2,3,4

5
10
15
20

Samples
Training Testing
8,480
13,760
18,272
21,984

1,472
2,400
3,200
3,872

Table 7: Number of samples for training and testing
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CHAPTER 4
Experiments and Results
In this section, we give experimental results for each of the four model types
tested. We conclude this section with a comparison of the different models.
4.1

Using MLPs Only
The structural layout of our first model using only MLPs is given in Figure 12.

Note that in this model, no LSTMs were used. The MLP layers are represented by
dense layers. The first dense layer learns the features of each input while the second
dense layer is the classifier. The experimental results for this model appear in Table 8.
For five families, this model performs quite well with average accuracy of 83.56%.
However, the accuracy drops significantly when more families are added.

Figure 12: Structural layout of the baseline model using just MLPs.

4.2

LSTM Model Without Embedding
The structural layout of our most basic LSTM model is given in Figure 13. Note

that the model consists of four types layers, namely, an input layer, dropout layers, an
LSTM layer, and a dense layer. The experimental results are shown in Table 9. This
model struggles with classifying just five families, with an accuracy value of 55.73%.
The accuracy drops as more families are classified with the largest drop in accuracy
occurring from classifying five families to ten. Clearly, a more sophisticated model is
required.

Figure 13: Structural layout of the LSTM model without embedding.
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Model Using Just MLPs
Number of Unique
Families to Classify

Accuracy Per
Experiment (%)

Overall Average
Accuracy (%)

5

81.95
84.08
82.41
85.14
84.21

83.56

10

56.31
56.81
59.40
61.50
53.48

57.50

15

49.27
53.18
54.82
54.54
44.31

51.22

20

53.83
45.68
52.92
46.87
53.08

50.48

Table 8: Experimental results for the model using just MLPs.

4.3

LSTM Model With Embedding
In this model, we add an embedding layer to our basic LSTM, as illustrated in

Figure 14. Note that the embedding layer is between the input and LSTM layer. The
experimental results are shown in Table 10. With the addition of this layer, we see a
significant improvement in the accuracy, with an average result of 74.66% with five
families, but the accuracy drops dramatically when 10 or more families are considered.
4.4

BiLSTM Model With Embedding
The structural layout of this model shown in Figure 15. The only difference

from our previous model is that the uni-directional LSTM layer has been replaced
with a biLSTM layer. The experimental results for this model are given in Table 10.
From the results, we can see that a biLSTM is far more powerful than an LSTM
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Model Without Embedding
Number of Unique
Families to Classify

Accuracy Per
Experiment (%)

Overall Average
Accuracy (%)

5

63.91
48.44
63.65
42.94
60.73

55.73

10

40.50
36.96
41.46
43.75
33.71

39.28

15

32.65
35.56
32.34
35.06
36.46

34.47

20

34.25
27.74
30.42
30.45
29.88

30.55

Table 9: Experimental results for the model without embedding.

Figure 14: Structural layout of the LSTM model with embedding.

in this context, as the accuracy has improved significantly. In fact, the accuracy
when classifying 20 families with this biLSTM model is nearly as good as the 5-family
accuracy for the previous model.
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Model With Embedding
Number of Unique
Families to Classify

Accuracy Per
Experiment (%)

Overall Average
Accuracy (%)

5

76.09
73.64
73.17
76.90
73.51

74.66

10

54.46
56.96
55.67
54.71
52.90

54.89

15

54.28
51.97
50.28
53.22
57.03

53.36

20

51.11
52.12
51.60
45.82
47.65

49.66

Table 10: Experimental results for the model with embedding.

Figure 15: Structural layout of the LSTM model with embedding and bidirectional LSTM.

4.5

Embedding, BiLSTM and CNN Model
The structural layout of this model appears Figure 16. Note that this model

includes all of the layers as the previous model with the addition of a one-dimension
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Model With Embedding and Bidirectional LSTM
Number of Unique
Families to Classify

Accuracy Per
Experiment (%)

Overall Average
Accuracy (%)

5

89.47
90.83
89.95
85.94
92.12

89.66

10

79.58
79.54
78.13
78.79
80.46

79.30

15

76.13
76.13
76.66
76.28
72.31

75.50

20

73.71
74.74
69.53
74.10
74.72

73.36

Table 11: Experimental results for the model with embedding and bidirectional LSTM.

convolutional layer and a max pooling layer. The experimental results for this case
are shown in Table 12. The addition of these CNN layers improves accuracy, and the
improvement is most significant as more families are considered—even for 20 families,
we obtained a very respectable 81.06% average accuracy
4.6

Comparison of Results
A bar graph of the average accuracies for each model is shown in Figure 17. As

noted above, the MLP only model performs remarkably well for five families. It even
outperforms the LSTM model with embedding. For more than five families, however,
performance decreases rapidly.
The basic LSTM model also performs poorly, even with five families. This suggests
using only integer representation of opcode mnemonics is not enough to accurately
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Figure 16: Structural layout of the model incorporating biLSTMs, embedding and a CNN layer
where the 1DConv layer is a one dimensional convolutional layer and the MaxPool1D is a one
dimensional max pooling layer.

Figure 17: Comparison of the average evaluation accuracy values for the four models used in this
experiment for classifying malware families.
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Model With Embedding, BiLSTM and CNN
Number of Unique
Families to Classify

Accuracy Per
Experiment (%)

Overall Average
Accuracy (%)

5

93.00
96.33
92.73
94.70
94.32

94.32

10

90.42
90.29
81.29
89.58
85.29

87.38

15

87.69
87.56
82.59
87.31
89.41

86.91

20

83.29
76.34
80.60
82.18
82.88

81.06

Table 12: Experimental results for the model with embedding, biLSTM and CNN.

classify malware. More layers in the model is needed.
The addition of an embedding layer dramatically increases the accuracy. This
is not surprising given that previous work has shown that embedding layers can
greatly improve the accuracy of machine learning models when applied to opcode
sequences [35].
The substitution of a uni-directional LSTM layer with a bidirectional LSTM layer
improves upon the results even further. It seems that the largest increase in accuracy
between the embedding models with a uni-directional LSTM layer and the embedding
models with a biLSTM layer occurs when classifying more than five families. This
model performs quite well even with the most difficult task of classifying 20 families
where the average accuracy is slightly less than 75%. BiLSTMs and word embedding
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are often used together in NLP applications. However, their use in malware research
appears to be very uncommon to this point in time. Our models indicate that there is
much to be gained by considering both the forward and backward opcode sequence.
Perhaps the models are able to better distinguish families based on which patterns
appear more frequently by considering both the forward and backward sequences.
Finally, the addition of a one-dimensional CNN layer to the biLSTM and embedding layers gives the best performance among the five models studied in this research.
Compared to the model without a CNN layer, the addition of this layer seems to
have greater impact to performance when classifying more than five families. At
an average of 81 percent for classifying 20 families, this model performs remarkably
well. A possible explanation for why this model performs so well is that in addition
to the benefits that come from having an embedding and biLSTM layers, a CNN
layer helps the model by providing a different perspective on the opcode sequences.
Specifically, the CNNs focus on local structure whereas the biLSTMs are focused
on overall characteristics. The interplay between local and global structure has the
potential to provide the best of both, which we have combined together into a single
model. The addition of a max pooling layer serves to reduce noise and help the model
focus on just the most important features further highlighting the crucial aspects of
the local structure that the CNN highlights.
Confusion matrices for each model appear in the Appendix in Figure A.18 through
Figure A.22. These matrices show how often families are classified incorrectly and
show precisely where these misclassifications occur. For example, considering our best
model, we can see that it was able to classify 10 families with an accuracy of over
90%. In contrast, three families are badly misclassified, namely, Obfuscator, Agent
and Rbot with only 44%, 31% and 61% classified correctly, respectively.
There are a few key takeaways from these confusion matrices. First, we that there
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were four families that were consistently classified well even for the worst performing
model. These families are Winwebsec, Bho, Adload and Startpage. In the case of
Winwebsec, we had the most number of samples from this family from Table 1. We
can conclude that the high number of samples allowed each model to learn this family
well contributing to its high classification rate. Since we did not have as many samples
for the other families, however, we can conclude that there were perhaps a unique
patterns or characteristics in the sequence of opcodes that allowed the models to learn
each of these families well.
Secondly, from above, we can see that despite the high accuracy of our best
performing model, Obfuscator, Agent and Rbot were badly classified. For Obfuscator
and Rbot, we see a relatively high misclassification rate for the other family. The
model misclassified Obfuscator as Rbot 16% of the time while Rbot was misclassified
as Obfuscator 13% of the time. Perhaps there is too much similarity in the opcode
sequences between these two families for the model to tell them apart. With only 817
Rbot samples, we can surmise that perhaps with more Rbot samples, the model can
learn to better distinguish these two families.
We can also see that Agent was misclassified as Startpage 29% of the time.
However, Startpage was only misclassified as Agent 2% of the time. As with Rbot,
Agent only had 817 samples. Perhaps more Agent samples will allow for a higher
classification rate.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion and Future Work
In this project, we found that malware classification using only MLPs is only
feasible for a small number of families. However, for a greater number of families,
we found that long-short term memory (LSTM) models out performed MLP models.
Although using just a single LSTM layer alone yields poor results, we found that
incorporating techniques from natural language processing (NLP), specifically word
embedding and bidirectional LSTMs (biLSTM) greatly improves performance. We
also discovered that that we could obtain even better performance by including a
convolutional neural network (CNN) layer in our model. Our best model was able
to classify samples from 20 different malware families with an average accuracy in
excess of 81%. We conjecture that the interplay between the long-term memory of
the biLSTM and the local structure found by the CNN are the key to obtaining this
strong performance.
For future work, more classification experiments using more samples of families
that performed poorly on our best models would be of interest. This would reveal if
the cause of high misclassification was the result of having a low number of samples
or misclasssification resulted from some inherent opcode sequence structure that
the model was not able to distinguish. More can be done into investigating why
applying NLP techniques are so effective in classifying malware. The addition of an
embedding layer, greatly improved our model’s overall accuracy. Other techniques
can be considered. For example, we might apply principle component analysis (PCA)
to reduce the dimensionality of the weights obtained from the embedding layer. This
could reveal how each opcode is being represented in vector space. Additionally,
experiments involving different word embedding algorithms (e.g., GloVe) would be
worthwhile. Another area for possible work would be to create a model using only
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MLPs and CNNs and compare the synergy between this model with the synergy
between our biLSTM and CNN model. Finally, further research into the possible
benefits of combining LSTMs and CNNs in this problem domain would be of great
interest.
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APPENDIX
Confusion Matrices

Figure A.18: Confusion matrix for the model using just MLPs only.
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Figure A.19: Confusion matrix for the model without embedding.
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Figure A.20: Confusion matrix for the model with an embedding layer.
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Figure A.21: Confusion matrix for the model with embedding and biLSTM layers.
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Figure A.22: Confusion matrix for the model with embedding, biLSTM and CNN and max pooling
layers.
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